Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies: The California Housing Market by Waldorf, Brigitte S. et al.
Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local 
Growth Control Policies: The California Housing Market 
 
 
 
 
Brigitte S. Waldorf
a, Pillsung Byun
b and Raymond J.G.M. Florax
a,c 
a Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907, USA  
Email: bwaldorf@purdue.edu; Email: rflorax@purdue.edu 
b Urban and Regional Planning Research Division, Korea Research Institute for Human 
Settlement,  Seoul, Korea, Email: drbyun@krihs.re.kr 
c Department of Spatial Economics, Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics Association 
 
Annual Meeting, Providence, Rhode Island, July 24-27, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright 2005 by Brigitte Waldorf, Pillsung Byun and Raymond Florax.  All rights reserved.  Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means,  provided that this copyright 
notice appears on such copies. Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
 
 
 
 
  1
Abstract.  Since  the  1970s,  growth  controls  spread  across  many  metropolitan  regions  in  the 
United States. Several studies address the effects of local growth controls on housing markets, 
particularly its price effect, which is induced by rising construction cost, constrained housing 
supply,  improved  amenities,  and  market  reorientation  of  homebuilders.  However,  only  few 
studies explicitly address inter-jurisdictional spatial spillovers and strategic interaction of policy-
makers of different jurisdictions in the design of growth control policies. This study focuses on 
two housing market outcomes, supply of new housing and market orientation, and utilizes a 
spatial econometric framework to systematically investigate local and global spatial spillovers 
giving rise to spatial multiplier effects. Preliminary results suggest that market orientation of new 
home  building  is  primarily  influenced  by  population  growth  and  building  permit  caps,  with 
positive spillovers at the local level only. For the supply of new housing, however, the models 
seem to suggest positive global spillover effects. However, there is additional indication of a 
potential relevance of including spatial heterogeneity in the model specification. Specifically, a 
north-south  disparity  or  a  coastal-inland  disparity  may  have  non-negligible  impacts  with 
concurrent implications for policy-making.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1970s, growth control and growth management measures have become quite 
popular  in  the  planning  efforts  of  local  jurisdictions  in  the  United  States.  Growth  control 
measures limit population growth or housing construction, usually in the form of population 
growth caps, residential building permit caps or even moratoria, and restrictive zoning, such as 
large minimum lot zoning. Growth management measures are an alternative to ad hoc strategies 
of  dealing  with  urban  growth  and  refer  to  measures  that  respond  to  anticipated  growth  by 
minimizing  growth-induced  costs  yet  still  accommodating  growth.  These  measures  typically 
include urban growth boundaries, procedural requirements for development, and requirements 
for  the  provision  of  infrastructure.  As  Landis  (1992)  points  out,  growth  control  and  growth 
management  measures  are  often  intermingled  in  the  real  world.    Thus,  to  simplify  the 
terminology, we will use the term ‘growth control’ to refer to both types of measures.  Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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The adoption of growth controls has been quite substantial, in particular in the State of 
California.  As documented by Levin (1999), it was during the 1980s that the enactment of local 
growth controls swept across the state. This can be attributed to a variety of factors, foremost to 
accelerated population growth, rapid suburbanization and urban sprawl, increasing concern about 
urban  growth-induced  costs,  and  the  constraints  of  local  fiscal  resources  brought  about  by 
Proposition  13
1 (Glickfeld  and  Levine  1992;  Pincetl  1994;  Levine  1999,  Byun  et  al.  2005). 
Moreover, the diffusion of growth controls was also propelled by strategic interaction among 
local  jurisdictions  (Brueckner  1998),  a  process  that  is  certainly  facilitated  by  political 
fragmentation so typical of metropolitan areas in California (Glickfeld and Levine 1992).  
The increased prevalence of growth controls has spurred a flood of studies that address 
the  impact  of  growth  controls  on  local  housing  markets,  including  the  social  issues  such  as 
exclusion  of  low-income  populations  (Schwartz  et  al.  1981,  Levine  1999,  Pendall  2000).  A 
primary focus in these studies are price effects of growth controls (e.g., Fischel 1990, Singell and 
Lillydahl  1990,  Janczyk  and  Constance  1980,  Pollakowski  and  Wachter  1990,  Landis  1986, 
Schwartz et al. 1981, Katz and Rosen 1987, Phillips and Goodstein 2000). Empirical estimates of 
the magnitude of price effects do, however, paint a mixed picture.  For example, Katz and Rosen 
(1987) estimate that housing in growth-controlled communities is between 17 and 38 percent 
higher than in non-growth controlled communities.  In contrast, in their analysis of urban growth 
regulations, Phillips and Goodstein (2000) find that urban growth boundaries have a relatively 
small price effect.   
                                                 
1 Proposition 13, passed in 1978, is a California initiative for lessening property tax burden. The initiative 
brought the assessed value of property back to the level of 1975, limited the annual increase in the 
assessed  value  to  2%, and  did  not permit  annual  property  tax rate of  over  1%  without  a two-thirds 
majority for the tax rate in California state legislature (Fulton 1993).      Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
 
 
 
 
  3
The ambiguous empirical results are not surprising given that housing price changes may 
be viewed as aggregate outcomes of a complex web of growth-control induced effects on a 
variety  of  factors.  These  factors  include  the  cost  of  land,  regulatory  development  delays, 
planning costs, quantity of new housing supplied, amenities, barriers to homebuilders’ entry into 
the housing market, and homebuilders’ market re-orientations towards upscale market segments. 
Moreover, different types of growth controls may influence these components differently.  Many 
studies, therefore, focus on particular types of growth controls and / or particular components of 
the complex web of causative factors. For example, Schwartz et al. (1981) conclude that growth 
controls lead to higher housing quality and thus price increases of new housing.  Landis (1986) 
suggests that price effects are indirect, i.e., that restrictions placed on developable land supply 
foster a monopoly of few homebuilders and thus exclusive power over prices and quality of new 
housing.  Mayer and Somerville (2000) argue that land use regulations, especially those that 
lengthen the development process, reduce new construction and price elasticities.  Levine (1999) 
finds that growth control policies that restrict developable land and reduce residential densities, 
lower the supply of new housing.   
The  literature  also  pays  attention  to  the  timing  of  the  impact  of  growth  controls  on 
housing market outcomes (Janczyk and Constance 1980, Thorson 1997, Mayer and Somerville 
2000). For example, Janczyk and Constance (1980) distinguish between anticipatory impacts and 
direct  impacts  once  the  policy  is  in  effect,  and  suggest  that  supply  expansions  during  the 
anticipatory stage may be responsible for lagged direct effects on the supply of new housing.    
In addition to temporal aspects, the literature is also cognizant of potential spatial effects.  
There seems to be a universal understanding that the factors coming into play when analyzing Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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the impacts of growth controls on housing market outcomes, have explicit spatial components, 
and  the  literature  repeatedly  alludes  to  the  importance  of  potential  spatial  dependencies,  in 
particular in the form of spatial spillovers. For example, Janczyk and Constance (1980) suggest 
that – in anticipation of pending growth control enactments – supply and demand in adjacent 
jurisdictions shift outward. Similarly, Pollakowski and Wachter (1990) find that housing prices 
are  positively  related  to  zoning  restrictiveness  in  adjacent  areas,  and  conclude  that  growth 
controls induce a spatial spillover of demand. Elliot (1981) concludes that “local consequences 
of growth controls do not adequately reflect the regional consequences; the price effects do not 
solely occur within a single jurisdiction but rather occur among many jurisdictions; therefore 
price effects should be considered within the context of the region as a whole” (p. 129). Thorson 
(1994) and Levine (1999) suggest that growth controls induce shifts in new housing construction 
to adjacent areas with fewer controls.   
So far the literature has not advanced beyond an acknowledgement of the existence of 
spatial effects (Katz and Rosen 1987, Schwartz et al. 1981) and, at best, accounts for spatial 
effects  rather  rudimentarily,  for  example,  by  including  a  variable  that  controls  for  growth 
controls in adjacent areas (Pollakowski and Wachter 1990). However, a rigorous treatment of 
spatial  dependencies  inherent  in  the  effects  of  growth  controls  on  housing  markets  is  still 
lacking.   
In this paper, we therefore analyze the effects of local growth controls on local housing 
market outcomes in a spatial econometric setting that allows for investigating spatial spillovers 
and  interactions  among  neighboring  jurisdictions.  Specifically,  we  adopt  the  framework  put 
forward by Anselin (2003) that distinguishes between local and global spatial spillovers.  Local Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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spillovers  take  effect  within  a  spatially  limited  range  of  neighboring  localities.    In  contrast, 
global  spillovers  extend  through  the  entire  system  of  spatially  dependent  localities.  In  the 
analysis of spatial spillovers, we distinguish between five different types of growth control, and 
focus specifically on two types of housing market outcomes: the magnitude of new housing 
supply,  and  homebuilders’  market  reorientation  toward  upscale  segments  of  local  housing 
markets.  We use data of the 1988 comprehensive survey of local growth controls in California, 
as  well  as  local  jurisdictions’  residential  building  permit  issuance  data,  and  general  data  on 
population and housing. 
Following this introduction, we first review the mechanisms of market re-orientation and 
constraints of new housing supply in response to growth controls, and conceptually distinguish 
different types of spatial spillovers that come into play when analyzing these housing market 
outcomes  of  growth  controls.  We  then  describe  the  data  and  present  an  exploratory  spatial 
analysis of growth controls, new housing supply, and market orientation towards upscale housing 
in the State of California.  Next, we discuss the results of the spatial econometric models of new 
housing supply and market orientation. The final section concludes by presenting summaries of 
the results, and suggesting further research.  
 
2.MARKET REORIENTATION AND NEW HOUSING SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS 
Local  growth  controls  raise  housing  construction  costs  and  reduce  profitability  of 
homebuilding. Homebuilders may respond by reorienting their target markets towards housing Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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for  high-income  homebuyers
2 (see  Dowall  1979,  1984;  Schwartz  et  al.  1984;  Landis  1986; 
Nelson et al. 2002; Pendall 2000). In fact, the switch to upscale and larger-size housing can be 
interpreted as a strategy aimed at counterbalancing the reduced profitability resulting from local 
growth controls (Dowall 1979, 1984; Landis 1986).  
The market reorientation strategy can be performed more effectively when homebuilders 
secure monopolistic positions in local housing markets. Several studies suggest that local growth 
controls  can  confer  the  monopolistic  power  on  homebuilders,  particularly  large-size 
homebuilding  firms  (Landis  1986;  Dowall  1984;  Rosen  and  Katz  1981;  Frieden  1983; 
Somerville 1999). The controls force incumbent homebuilders out of local housing markets by 
increasing construction costs, and these homebuilders then move to jurisdictions without growth 
controls (Levine 1999). In addition, growth controls function as barriers to market entry of new 
homebuilders (Dowall 1979, 1984; Landis 1986). In this situation, remaining homebuilders will 
likely have the power to control price as well as quality of new housing. Stated otherwise, with 
monopolistic  power,  the  remaining  (particularly,  large-size)  homebuilders  can  extract  excess 
profits, and can shift their targets to the upscale market segments without intense competition. 
The market reorientation mechanism operating in a growth-controlled local housing market is 
summarized in Figure 1. 
< Figure 1 about here > 
 
As  an  alternative  response  to  growth  control-induced  reduction  in  profitability  of 
homebuilding,  homebuilders  may  reduce  or  even  abandon  housing  construction  in  growth-
controlled jurisdictions, and move to localities without growth controls (see Rosen and Katz 
                                                 
2 Note that the upscale trend is also a consequence of local growth controls that directly influence the 
quality of new housing (Landis 1986). Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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1981;  Dowall  1984;  Landis  1986;  Lillydahl  and  Singell  1987;  Singell  and  Lillydahl  1990; 
Skidmore and Peddle 1998; Levine 1999; Nelson et al. 2002). Local growth controls will thus 
not  only  induce  a  shift  towards  upscale  market  segments,  but  also  constrain  the  amount  of 
homebuilding  (Dowall  1984;  Nelson  et  al.  2002;  Landis  1986;  Lillydahl  and  Singell  1987; 
Singell  and  Lillydahl  1990;  Skidmore  and  Peddle  1998;  Levine  1999).  As  Janczyk  and 
Constance (1980) argue, “[a] common feature of local growth control measures is restriction of 
housing  supply”  (p.  11).  Thus,  in  localities  imposing  growth  controls,  the  number  of  newly 
constructed housing units is likely to decrease. This sets in motion spillovers as the reduction in 
housing  construction  shifts  housing  demand  from  growth-controlled  localities  to  neighboring 
localities  with  no  or  fewer  controls.  Although  the  existing  vacant  housing  stock  of  nearby 
localities can absorb initial spillovers, this reserve will soon disappear, creating demand for new 
housing. This condition may lead homebuilders in growth-controlled jurisdictions to enter the 
proximate  non-growth-controlled  jurisdictions  (Levine  1999).  As  a  result,  the  neighboring 
localities will likely experience an increase in housing construction. The controls discourage 
many  incumbent  homebuilders  from  constructing  housing  by  increasing  costs  and  reducing 
profitability of homebuilding. As a result, supply of new housing is reduced and housing prices 
are inflated. 
 
3. SPATIAL EFFECTS 
The above discussion suggests that a comprehensive evaluation of growth controls and 
their  effect  on  housing  market  outcomes  needs  to  take  place  within  the  system  of  spatially 
dependent localities rather than focus on localities as independent entities.  We investigate three Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
 
 
 
 
  8
types of spatial dependencies to capture the hypothesized spillover effects of growth control 
policies. The first type, already identified in the literature, is the effect of growth controls not 
only on housing market outcomes in the own community but also for the immediate neighbors. 
From a spatial econometric perspective, these effects can easily be accommodated in a spatial 
cross-regressive model (Florax and Folmer 1992, Anselin 2003). It takes on the form:  
y = Gb b b b + W Gg g g g + W X x x x x + X d d d d + e e e e 
where y is the n￿1 vector including the observations on the housing market variable (supply of 
new housing, or market orientation of homebuilding), G denotes the matrix of growth policy 
variables, W is a n￿n matrix describing adjacency linkages
3 between localities, X is a n￿k 
matrix of control variables,  b b b b, g g g g, z z z z, and d d d d are parameter vectors, and e e e e is the i.i.d. N(0,s
2I) error 
term. Note that WG is a matrix of the “average growth controls” in neighboring localities. The 
interpretation  of  the  parameters  in  a  spatial  cross-regressive  model  is  straightforward.  For 
example, if y denotes the supply of new housing then – following the discussion above – we 
expect a b parameter  to be negative if the associated growth control policy reduces the supply of 
new housing in the own community, and the g parameter to be positive if the policy shifts new 
housing supply to neighboring areas.  
This cross-regressive model captures local spillovers.  That is, following Anselin (2003) 
such a model is appropriate if the spatial range of the growth control policy only extends into the 
immediate  localities.    If  however,  it  is  assumed  that  the  spatial  spillovers  are  global,  i.e., 
                                                 
3 A frequently used weight matrix, which is also adopted in this paper, is the row-standardized contiguity 
matrix where wij = 1/ni (ni is the number of neighbors of i) if localities i and j are neighbors, and wij = 0 
otherwise. The diagonal elements of weight matrices are set equal to zero. It should be noted that spatial 
associations can also be defined in a variety alternative ways, e.g., in terms of distances. The diagonal 
elements of weight matrices are set equal to zero. Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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spreading through the entire system, then different models need to be specified.   The most 
commonly known model is the spatial lag model (Anselin 1988, 2003; Florax and  Nijkamp 
2004) which takes on the form: 
y = r WY + Gb b b b + X d d d d + e e e e       
where r denotes the spatial auto-regressive parameter. The spatial dependence captured in the 
spatial lag model is often referred to as substantive spatial dependence, in which the dependent 
variable Y affects, and is affected by the realizations of Y in neighboring areas. This second type 
of  spatial  dependency  results  if  housing  market  outcomes  in  one  region  are  functionally 
dependent  on  those  of  neighboring  regions.    This  dependency  may,  for  example,  be  due  to 
neighboring housing markets being substitutes, and thus be equally profitable for homebuilders, 
or development in one locality spurring spillover of development into adjacent housing markets.   
The reduced form of the model does, however, suggest an alternative interpretation that 
speaks directly to spillover effects (Anselin 2003):  
y = (I-r W)
-1 (Gb b b b +  X d d d d + 
 e e e e)       
or 
y = (I-r W)
-1 Gb b b b +  (I-r W)
-1 X d d d d + (I-r W)
-1 e e e e       
The matrix (I-r W)
-1 ensures that spatial externalities travel through the entire system and thus 
are not constrained to the immediate neighbors. Thus, the spatial lag model responds to global 
spillovers (Anselin 2003). But, the model also suggests that spatial externalities are present in all 
modeled effects (i.e., not just G but also the control variables X) and in the errors.
4  In particular, 
spatially correlated errors will arise due to omitted spatially correlated variables. 
                                                 
4 Note that removing the constraints of identical autoregressive parameters and identical weight matrices 
is a straightforward generalization.  Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
 
 
 
 
  10
A third type of model, a spatial error model, is appropriate if we assume that global 
spatial effects are solely due to the unmodeled effects (error terms). The spatial dependency 
captured in the spatial error model is often referred to as “nuisance dependence” (Anselin and 
Rey, 1991) because it is caused either by omitted spatially correlated variables or by the spatial 
extent  of,  in  the  context  of  this  paper,  the  housing  market  not  coinciding  with  the  actual 
behavioral unit of housing market actors.  From an econometric perspective, this type of spatial 
dependence is  reflected  in spatially  autocorrelated error terms, and leads to the spatial  error 
model of the form: 
Y = Gb b b b + X d d d d + e,  e,  e,  e, where e e e e = lWe e e e + u u u u 
or 
Y = Gb b b b + X d d d d + (I -l W)
-1  u u u u 
 
where l is the spatial error coefficient, and u u u u ~  N(0,s
2I I I I) are independent error terms.  
Multiplying
5 by (I -l W) shows that the spatial error model includes both the “spatially lagged 
dependent variable and the spatially lagged exogenous variables” (Anselin 2003): 
 Y = l W Y + (Gb b b b + X d)  d)  d)  d) - l (Gb b b b + X d) d) d) d) + u u u u 
The  spatial  econometrics  literature  has  developed  a  series  of  tests  to  investigate  the 
presence of spatial dependencies, as well as tests to identify the proper model (for an overview 
see Florax and Nijkamp 2004).  Both the spatial lag model and the spatial error model need to be 
solved via maximum likelihood estimators. Ignoring the spatial dependencies captured in these 
models leads to misspecifications and invalid inferences (Anselin 1988).  In particular, OLS 
                                                 
5 Note that this transformation introduces nonlinear constraints on the parameters. To ensure equivalence, 
of the two specifications are only the same if the estimated lambda and the estimated beta equal product 
of the parameter estimates (common factor hypothesis; see Anselin (1988)).  
 Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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estimators  are  biased  and  inconsistent  if  ignoring  the  spatially  lagged  dependent  variable 
(Anselin 1988). Ignoring the spatially correlated error leads to inefficient estimators and thus 
affects the standard errors of the parameter estimators.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
4.1 Study Area and Data 
The empirical analysis targets local jurisdictions in the State of California. California is a 
pioneer of growth control and management measures (Fulton 1993). Since the 1970s, a rapidly 
increasing number of jurisdictions has adopted growth controls across the state (Glickfeld and 
Levine 1992). In California, attempts to establish statewide or region-wide growth control and 
management for overcoming the lack of regional coordination continually failed (Pincetl 1994). 
In fact, political fragmentation – a critical condition for the enactment and diffusion of local 
growth  controls  –  is  a  dominant  characteristic  throughout  California  (Glickfeld  and  Levine 
1992).  
In the empirical analysis, we utilize the unique data set compiled by Glickfeld and Levine 
(1992).  They conducted a comprehensive survey of local growth controls within California in 
1988-1989.
6 The  survey  data  provide  information  on  types  and  numbers  of  growth  controls 
implemented in each locality as of 1988. From this information, we use the growth controls 
applied to residential development as summarized in Table 1: population growth or housing 
permit caps; urban growth boundaries; adequate public facility ordinances; restrictive residential 
zoning (e.g., large minimum-lot size requirement, downzoning); and restrictive zoning approvals 
                                                 
6 In  total,  443  of  508  jurisdictions  responded  to  the  survey  –  all  58  counties  and  385  out  of  450 
incorporated cities in California.  Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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(e.g., requirement of council supermajority or voter approval for increase in residential density). 
Unfortunately, the data do not include information of the adoption year or on the annual status of 
each control in each locality. 
<Table 1 about here> 
The  primary  data  on  housing  market  outcomes  are  taken  from  the  “Annual  New 
Privately-owned Residential Building Permits” data collected and reported by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  For every year, this data set provides the number of issued residential building permits 
for each local jurisdiction. The data exclude the building permits issued for the conversions of 
and alterations to existing residential buildings, and such buildings as mobile homes, hotels, 
motels,  nursing  homes,  and  college  dormitories.  A  three-year  average  for  1988-1990  of  the 
building  permit  data  are  used  to  operationalize  new  housing  supply.  Clearly,  such  building 
permit  data  do  not show  actual  housing  construction.  However,  considering  that  the  data  of 
housing construction are not available on an annual basis, the building permit data has repeatedly 
been used as a proxy for new construction (see Thorson 1997; Mayer and Somerville 2000).  
The  “Annual  New  Privately-owned  Residential  Building  Permits”  data  also  provide 
information  on  the  total  estimated  construction  costs  for  the  newly  permitted  residential 
buildings. The estimated construction costs exclude labor and land costs, and cover only material 
costs.
7   More  luxurious  homes  will  have  higher  construction  material  costs.  Thus  higher 
construction material costs will signal an “upmarket trend” (Landis 1986, p. 11). We therefore 
use  the  three-year  average  perdwelling  construction  material  costs  as  proxy  for  the  market 
orientation of homebuilders. 
                                                 
7 The Manufacturing and Construction Division of the U.S. Bureau of Census confirmed this for our 
work.   Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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These  data  are  merged  with  population  and  housing  data  from  the  1980  Census  of 
Housing, and the 1990 Census of Population and Housing.  In addition, intercensal population 
estimates for California counties and cities are taken from the Department of Finance of the State 
of California (http://www.dof.ca.gov). The data merging provides complete information for 420 
of the 508 jurisdictions in California (see Figure 2).  
4.2 Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis 
As of 1988, about 60 percent of the California jurisdiction had some form of growth 
control, many of them even having more than one growth control. In fact, the average number of 
(residential) growth control policies in Californian jurisdictions is 1.1. A small community to the 
southeast of San Francisco, San Juan Bautista, has enacted six growth control measures and 
constitutes the most highly growth controlled locality in California. As summarized in Table 1, 
the most pervasive measures are adequate public facility ordinances (30 percent) and restrictive 
zoning (29 percent).  The least frequently enacted measures are restrictive zoning approvals (12 
percent) and caps on population growth or housing permits (14 percent).  The frequency of urban 
growth boundaries takes on a middle position, with 18 percent.  
< Figure 2 about here> 
Figure  2  and  Table  2  show  that  communities  with  growth  control  policies  are  not 
randomly  scattered  across  the  state,  but  tend  to  cluster.  For  all  growth  policies  –  with  the 
exception of localities with restrictive zoning approvals – Moran’s I is significantly positive.
8 
Moreover,  for  all  policies,  the  percentage  of  communities  with  a  growth  policy  that  are 
                                                 
8 Moran’s I is a measure of global spatial autocorrelation.  For random patterns, the expected value, E(I), 
equals –1/(n-1).  I  > -1/(n-1) signals positive spatial autocorrelation, i.e., similar values cluster together.  
For I < -1/(n-1), dissimilar values are located in close proximity to each other.  For a comprehensive 
overview of Moran’s I (global and local) see Anselin (1995, 1996).  Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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surrounded by other communities with the same growth policy, is substantially higher than the 
equivalent percentages for communities without the policies. That is, the dominant spatial pattern 
is one of clustering of communities without the growth policy, and the clustering of localities 
with the policy.   
< Table 2 about here > 
  The clustering is particularly strong for the 58 communities with population growth or 
building permit caps.  These communities are nearly exclusively located in the metropolitan 
areas along the coast.  Thirty-five percent each are located in the Los Angeles and San Francisco 
CMSAs  where  they  make  up  14  percent  and  21.5  percent  of  all  communities,  respectively. 
Communities with an urban growth boundary are also significantly clustered and seem to be 
predominantly  a  “northern  phenomenon”.    Whereas  communities  without  urban  growth 
boundaries  are  equally  divided  by  the  36  degree  latitude  (which  is  located  slightly  south  of 
Monterey), about three quarters of all communities with an urban growth boundary are located 
north of 36 degree latitude.  In these northern portions of the state, communities with growth 
boundaries also extend into the more peripheral inland sections of California.  Moreover, both 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan communities have about the same share of communities with 
urban growth boundaries. Jurisdictions with adequate public facility ordinances, and jurisdictions 
with restrictive zoning show about an equal amount of moderate spatial clustering.  However, 
there are some differences at the local scale.  Whereas adequate public facility ordinances are 
quite frequently found in the more peripheral inland areas, restrictive zoning policies are very 
much a “southern phenomenon”.  In both the Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas, the 
percentages of localities with restrictive zoning far exceed the state average of 28.6 percent.   Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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The  above  discussion  illuminates  that  the  spatial  distributions  of  growth  controls  are 
positively  spatially  autocorrelated,  thereby  reinforcing  Brueckner’s  (1998)  conclusion  that 
growth policy decisions “are not taken in a vacuum” (p. 465). However, while Brueckner (1998) 
looks at the degree of growth control stringency by aggregating different types of controls, the 
discussion above suggests that a similar result can be derived for each type of growth control 
policy. But, it also suggests that there are non-negligible differences between the various types of 
growth controls.   
Relating  growth  control  policies,  enacted  in  different  types  of  localities,  to  housing 
market outcomes further illuminates that the spatial arrangement is of pivotal importance. The 
types of localities are defined as follows:  
 
None of the 
neighboring localities 
are growth-controlled 
At least one 
neighboring locality 
is growth-controlled 
Locality 
without growth 
control 
Type 1  Type 2 
Locality 
with growth 
control 
Type 3  Type 4 
 
The first type is included localities without growth policies and surrounded by localities 
that are also not growth controlled. These localities face unrestricted growth but are also not at 
risk of having to absorb demand shifts from the surrounding communities.  Interestingly, new 
supply in these localities is far above the state average and – as indicated by the below average 
material  costs  for  new  construction  –  the  new  housing  seems  to  be  targeted  to  low-income 
market segments. Surprising are, however, the housing market outcomes in Type-2 and Type-3 Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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localities.  Growth  in  Type-2  localities  is  unrestricted,  but  they  are  surrounded  by  growth-
controlled communities and thus could serve as an ideal recipient for spillover in their neighbors’ 
homebuilding activity.  These are communities that should have the most intense homebuilding 
activity.  However, as shown in Table 3, they actually record the least. Their average material 
costs are about equal to the state-average. Growth in Type-3 localities is restricted and, since 
they are surrounded by communities with unrestricted growth, they should easily be able to shift 
homebuilding activities into the adjacent localities. But Type-3 localities are not distinguished by 
below average homebuilding activity. Interesting is also that homebuilders in these communities 
do not seem to participate in the hypothesized upscale market trend: in fact, the average material 
costs are well below the state average. Finally, Type-4 localities which are growth controlled and 
are surrounded by other growth-controlled localities show average, rather than below average, 
homebuilding activity.  This may be interpreted as a result of homebuilders not being able to 
penetrate adjacent  growth-controlled markets.   Interestingly, however, homebuilding in these 
growth-controlled  communities  seems  to  be  strongly  directed  towards  the  upscale  market: 
average material costs are substantially above those in other types of localities.  
< Table 3 about here > 
The housing market outcomes, i.e., the supply of new housing and the market orientation, 
are  also  clustered.  Figure  3  shows  that  below  average  new  construction  (permits)  is  more 
dominant in coastal areas.  These are also the areas in which upscale building (above average 
material costs) is more prevalent.  In fact, upscale market orientation is almost non-existent in 
the peripheral inland areas. The spatial dependence of both housing market variables is of course 
expected  if  they  are  influenced  by  the  spatially  correlated  growth  control  policies.  Yet,  the Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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strength of the spatial autocorrelation coefficients is an indication that growth-controlled induced 
spillovers may well extend beyond the immediate neighbors and operate throughout the entire 
system of Californian jurisdictions.  As outlined in a previous section, if this is the case then a 
spatial cross-regressive model is not sufficient to capture the spillovers.  The following section 
investigates this issue via a series of spatial econometric models. 
<Figure 3 about here > 
4.3 Spatial Econometric Spillover Models 
We begin our investigation with models that do not consider spillover effect.  That is, we 
specify a models of the housing market outcomes (new housing supply and market orientation, 
respectively)  that  include  five  dummy  variables  capturing  the  presence  of  growth  control 
measures  as  defined  in  Table  1,  and  a  set  of  control  variables.    The  choice  of  additional 
exogenous variables is constrained by limited data availability as well as the attempt to avoid 
severe multicollinearity.  For the new housing supply model of average annual new housing 
permits issued from 1988 to 1990, the control variables include STOCK (existing housing stock 
as of 1990
9), POPG (annual population growth between 1985 and 1988), HPG (growth of single 
family housing prices between 1985 and 1988), and METRO (a dummy variable distinguishing 
metropolitan from non-metropolitan jurisdictions). The housing stock variable is a supply side 
control but also checks size effects.  Population growth is a control for demand pressure, and 
housing price growth controls for housing market inflation.  The metropolitan variable serves to 
check additional heterogeneity of the local housing markets by picking up differences between 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan housing markets. For the market orientation model of the per 
                                                 
9 Data on existing housing in 1988 is not available. Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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dwelling construction material costs of new housing permits between 1988 and 1990, the control 
variables include the 1990 median household income
10 as a proxy for the demand of upscale 
housing and homebuilding profitability, the population growth variable, housing growth variable, 
and the metropolitan dummy. With the exception of the dummy variables, all variables enter the 
model in logarithmic form so as to reduce heteroskedasticity and allow easy interpretation in the 
form of elasticities.  All models are estimated using SpaceStat software.  
< Table 4 about here > 
The results, presented in Table 4, are quite unexpected.  While the control variables show 
the  anticipated  behavior,  i.e.,  housing  stock  size  and  population  growth  are  positively,  and 
housing  price  growth  is  negatively  related  to  the  new  supply,  and  vice  versa  to  market 
orientation.
11  
In the model of market orientation, only one growth control measure shows the expected 
positive impact: ceteris paribus, caps on population growth / housing permit caps significantly 
and substantially increase the construction material costs of new housing by 10 percent.  All 
other  growth  controls  do  not  have  an  effect  on  market  orientation.  Remarkable  is  also  the 
estimated  nine percent
12 cost difference between non-metropolitan and metropolitan localities.  
In  the  model  of  new  housing  supply,  only  one  growth  control  variable  shows  the 
expected  negative  impact  on  the  provision  of  new  housing.  Restrictive  zoning  significantly 
reduces the new supply: compared to jurisdictions without restrictive zoning, localities with a 
restrictive zoning policy experience a 44.5 percent reduction in newly issued permits.  Adequate 
                                                 
10 Income data for 1988 is  not available. 
11 In fact, new housing supply and market orientation seem to be jointly determined. We are presently 
exploring the assessment of spillovers in a simultaneous equation set-up. 
12 Based on the formula exp(b-.5VAR(b))-1 (see Kennedy 1981). Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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public facility ordinances and restrictive zoning approvals have no effect on new housing supply. 
Caps and urban growth boundaries are even estimated to increase the supply, and the magnitudes 
are quite substantial with 43 and 41 percent, respectively.  
The diagnostics for spatial dependence suggest, however, that the new housing supply 
model  and  –  to  a  lesser  extent  –  the  market  orientation  may  suffer  from  misspecifications. 
Moran’s I for the error terms are significant in both models. Moreover, the (robust) Lagrange 
multiplier  test  for  the  error  is  highly  significant  for  the  new  housing  supply  model,  and 
marginally  significant  for  the  market  orientation  model,  whereas  in  both  cases  the  robust 
Lagrange multiplier for the spatial lag model is insignificant.  Thus, the diagnostics point into the 
direction of a spatial error model as the proper specification, and implicitly to the existence of 
global spillover effects as discussed in Section 3. However, before presenting the results for 
global spillovers in the form of spatial error and spatial lag models, we will first investigate 
whether we can find evidence of local spillovers.  Towards that end, we estimate spatial cross-
regressive model for both housing market variables, where spatially lagged exogenous variables 
are included as well. The results are presented in Table 5.  
The spatial cross-regressive market orientation model suggests that caps are associated 
with an upscale market trend. However, the estimated effect is smaller than in the aspatial model, 
amounting to only 7.7 percent. The deficit impact is compensated by the spillover effect from 
neighboring areas.  That is, the model suggests very strong positive spillovers of the effect of 
growth caps into neighboring localities. Interestingly, none of the other growth control policies 
or their spatial lags have a significant impact on market orientation.  The diagnostics for spatial 
dependence indicate that there is no significant spatial autocorrelation left in the residuals.  Thus, Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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the  growth-control-induced  local  spillover  effects  do  account  sufficiently  for  spatial 
dependencies in market orientation. 
< Table 5 about here > 
A different picture emerges for the cross-regressive model of new housing supply. Here, 
the results of the aspatial model continue to hold, namely caps and urban growth boundaries 
increase  new  construction  whereas  restrictive  zoning  diminishes  the  amount  of  housing 
construction.  However,  for  only  two  of  these  growth  control  policies,  the  spatially  lagged 
variables  also  exert  significant  influences  on  new  construction.  Caps  on  population 
growth/homebuilding in neighboring localities increase the amount of construction in the own 
locality by about 25 percent, thus indicating a positive spatial spillover. In contrast, the model 
suggests a negative spillover for restrictive zoning. That is, restrictive zoning in neighboring 
localities lowers the amount of homebuilding in the own locality. The diagnostics for spatial 
dependence suggest that the cross-regressive model of new housing supply still suffers from 
positive spatial autocorrelation.  We thus turn to an investigation of global spillover effects.  
Following the arguments of Section 3, we estimate a spatial error model, as suggested by the 
(robust) LM error-test of the aspatial model presented in Table 4. The results are shown in Table 
6.  
< Table 6 about here > 
The  results  indicate  that  the  spatial  error  coefficient  is  highly  significant,  suggesting 
positive global spillover effects.  Interesting is also that – compared to the aspatial model – the 
estimated magnitude (and significance) of the growth control measures is substantially.  Caps 
increase  the  new  housing  supply  by  26  percent  and  urban  growth  boundaries  result  in  a  31 Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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percent increase (43  and 41 percent, respectively, in the aspatial model). Restrictive zoning, 
which in the aspatial model is estimated to reduce new supply by 26 percent, is expected to yield 
only a 20 percent decline when taking global spillovers into account. These results are strong 
evidence for the importance of global spillovers.  However, the diagnostics suggest that further 
model modifications are necessary.  Most importantly, all models presented here suffer from 
heteroskedasticity as evidenced by the highly significant Breusch-Pagan tests.  This issue will be 
picked up in subsequent research.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates the effects of local growth controls in California housing markets, 
focusing specifically on spatial spillover effects. We target two housing market outcomes, that 
the  literature  identified  as  being  influenced  by  growth  controls,  namely  the  supply  of  new 
housing and the market orientation of new supply. Using data for 420 jurisdictions in the State of 
California, we infer a number of interesting empirical results.   
First,  spatial  spillovers  play  a  prominent  role  in  understanding  the  effects  of  growth 
controls  on  housing  market  outcomes.  Spillovers  may  be  confined  locally,  with  effects  only 
reaching into the immediate neighborhood.  However, spillovers can also be global, that is they 
are being propelled throughout the entire spatial system of localities.  Interestingly, our results 
suggest that the type of spatial spillovers for the two housing market outcomes differs. Market 
orientation of new home building is primarily influenced by local spillovers that are driven by 
just one type of growth control, namely caps on population growth and building permits. That is, 
caps tend to foster an upmarket trend of new homebuilding and this influence extends into the Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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immediate  neighboring  localities.    There  is  no  evidence,  however,  for  global  spillovers.  In 
contrast, for the supply of new housing the results suggest positive global spillover effects that 
spread throughout the entire spatial system of California localities.  
Second,  from  a  conceptual  perspective,  ignoring  spatial  spillover  effects  implies  that 
jurisdictions  are  erroneously  treated  as  closed,  independent  entities.  Empirically,  the  results 
suggest that ignoring spatial spillovers tends to over-estimate the influence of growth controls on 
housing market outcomes (in the own locality). 
Third, the empirical results emphasize that the effects of growth control measures differ 
substantially and do not always seem to coincide with their intended goals. Caps on population 
growth / building permits actually increase the amount of new construction. They also are the 
only growth control measure that leads to an upscale market trend for new construction.  Urban 
growth boundaries have no effect on market orientation, but they strongly increase the amount of 
new construction. Unlike in the case of caps, this result is actually not counterintuitive since 
urban growth boundaries seek to contain growth within the boundary (Nelson and Moore 1993; 
Pendall 2000) but keep it unrestricted inside the boundary. Residential zoning restrictions are the 
only measures that reduce new construction, but they have no effect on the market orientation of 
new construction. 
Future research will tackle the unsolved methodological issues, in particular deal with 
heteroskedasticity. Instead of mechanically correcting for it, we will emphasize the identification 
of  sources  of  heteroskedasticity.  This  is  of  particular  importance  for  spatial  sources  of 
heteroskedasticity, e.g., a north-south disparity or a coastal-inland disparity, as they will most 
strongly interfere with a proper evaluation of spatial spillovers.  Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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Table 1. Definition of and Frequency of Growth Controls  
 
 Growth Control Policy   Definition 
Proportion of California 
Communities with Policy 
(as of 1988) 
Housing Permit Cap 
or Population Growth Cap 
To enforce the annual quota of housing building 
permits in order to slow rapid population growth 
and resulting increase in housing construction; 
Whether or not the quota is connected to annual 
target of population inflow differentiates between 
housing permit and population growth caps.  
.14 
Urban Growth Boundary 
To contain growth (or housing construction) 
within a designated boundary for a predetermined 
period; To confine provision of public 
infrastructure or services within the boundary in 
order to inhibit housing construction outside the 
boundary 
.18 
Adequate Public Facility 
Ordinances 
To require homebuilders or residential developers 
to provide sufficient public infrastructure in order 
to minimize impacts of new development on 
existing infrastructure 
.30 
Restrictive Residential 
Zoning 
To suppress residential density for housing 
construction – reduction of permitted density, 
allocation of existing residentially zoned land to 
less intense uses (e.g., open space) 
.29 
Restrictive Zoning 
Approval 
Required regulatory procedures (such as voter 
approval)   .12 
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Table 2. Spatial Autocorrelation of Growth Control Policies  
 
 
  
%  of Localities without 
growth control  
%  of Localities with 
growth control    Growth Control Policy   z-value of Moran’s I  
for which at least one neighbor has growth control policy 
Housing Permit Cap 
or Population Growth Cap 
(CAPS) 
5.704  31.2  62.0 
Urban Growth  
Boundary (UGB) 
3.827  48.0  72.4 
Adequate Public Facility 
Ordinances (APFO)  2.425  60.8  72.6 
Restrictive Residential 
Zoning (RZ)  2.558  58.3  75.8 
Restrictive Zoning 
Approval (RZA)  1.517  49.3  63.3 Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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Table 3. Average Housing Market Outcomes by Type of Locality 
 
Localities without growth policy  Localities with growth policy   
 
 
 
Housing Market Outcome 
Type 1 
Neighbors 
without growth 
policy 
(n=24) 
Type 2 
Neighbors:  
with growth 
policy 
(n=141) 
Type 3 
Neighbors: 
without growth 
policy 
(n=21) 
Type 4 
Neighbors: 
with growth 
policy 
(n=231) 
New Supply (in % of 
existing housing stock); 
State average: 2.516 
3.531  2.354  2.696  2.525 
Building Material Costs; 
State average: $128,525  $100,020  $129,393  $114,058  $132,291 
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Table 4. Aspatial Models of Housing Market Outcomes (OLS) 
 
Market Orientation  New Housing Supply  
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std.Err. 
Intercept  2.625***  0.413  -3.117***  0.325 
CAPS  0.097**  0.037  0.369***  0.131 
UGB  -0.013  0.033  0.353***  0.118 
APFO  -0.002  0.028  0.049  0.097 
RZ  0.017  0.029  -0.309***  0.101 
RZA  0.036  0.041  -0.054  0.141 
STOCK      0.911***  0.034 
INC  0.844***  0.043     
POPG  -1.090***  0.396  14.003***  1.377 
HPG  5.900***  1.833  -39.225***  5.341 
METRO  0.088**  0.042  -0.111  0.132 
n   417  420 
adj. R
2  0.682  0.707 
Condition Number  117.245  23.837 
J-B Test (p-value)  0.636  6.078 ** 
Regression 
Diagnostics 
b 
B-P Test (p-value)  19.102 **  38.293 *** 
Moran’s I  2.008 **  5.473 *** 
LM-error  3.020 *  26.171 *** 
Robust LM-error  2.254  20.046 *** 
LM-lag  0.924   6.910 *** 
Test for 
Spatial 
Dependence
ab  
 
Robust LM-lag  0.157  0.784 
a The tests are based on a row-standardized binary queen contiguity matrix. Alternative specifications for the weight 
matrix, such as distance band contiguity matrices, yield similar results. 
b J-B test: Jarque-Bera test on normality of errors; B-P test: Breusch-Pagan test on heteroscedasticity; LM-LAG: 
Lagrange multiplier test on spatial lag dependence; LM-ERR: Lagrange multiplier test on spatial error dependence; 
Robust LM-LAG: robust Lagrange multiplier test on spatial lag dependence; Robust LM-ERR: robust Lagrange 
multiplier test on spatial error dependence. 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance (2-tail) at the .1, .05, and .01 level, respectively. Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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Table 5. Spatial Cross-regressive Models of Housing Market Outcomes (OLS)
a 
 
Market Orientation  New Housing Supply 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std.Err. 
Intercept  2.595***  0.413  -2.055  0.554 
CAPS  0.075*  0.038  0.282**  0.133 
   W CAPS  0.172***  0.050  0.223  0.174 
UGB  -0.019  0.033  0.351***  0.117 
   W UGB  -0.023  0.038  -0.016  0.134 
APFO  0.002  0.028  0.045  0.096 
   W APFO  -0.051  0.040  0.039  0.141 
RZ  0.011  0.029  -0.291***  0.099 
   W RZ  0.014  0.043  -0.418***  0.148 
RZA  0.032  0.040  -0.077  0.138 
   W RZA  -0.026  0.049  -0.045  0.168 
STOCK      0.879***  0.034 
   W STOCK      -0.093*  0.047 
INC  0.854***  0.043     
W INC         
POPG  -1.191***  0.394  12.874***  1.393 
   W POPG        7.303***  2.007 
HPG  4.222**  1.936  -35.133***  5.812 
METRO  0.061  0.043     0.031  0.146 
n   417  420 
adj. R
2  0.689  0.723 
Condition Number  140.458  51.012 
J-B Test (p-value)  3.457   5.026 * 
Regression 
Diagnostics 
B-P Test (p-value)  32.010 ***  23.565 * 
Moran’s I  1.694 *  5.671 *** 
LM-error  1.886   26.186 *** 
Robust LM-error  1.329   0.486 
LM-lag  0.733   27.471 *** 
Test for 
Spatial 
Dependence
a 
(p-value) 
Robust LM-lag  0.177   1.771 
a see footnotes for Table 4 
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Table 6. Spatial Error Model of New Housing Supply (MLE)
a 
 
Spatial Error Model 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Err. 
Intercept  -3.289***  0.343 
l￿ (spatial error coeff.)  0.377***  0.052 
CAPS  0.239*  0.124 
UGB  0.278**  0.108 
APFO  0.064  0.091 
RZ  -0.180*  0.093 
RZA  0.0121  0.126 
STOCK  0.938***  0.031 
POPG  11.213***  1.301 
HPG  -44.870***  7.403 
METRO  -0.160  0.173 
n   420 
R
2  .716 
B-P Test (p-value)  22.198 *** 
Spatial  B-P  Test 
(p-value)  22.201 *** 
Like-Ratio  33.957 *** 
LM-lag  2.945 * 
Regression 
Diagnostics 
LM-error   
a see footnote for Table 4.  Strategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
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Figure 1. Local growth control-induced upscale market trend 
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Figure 2. Spatial Distribution of Growth Controlled Localities  
32
34
36
38
40
42
-125 -123 -121 -119 -117 -115
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
Sampled 
Jurisdictions
32
34
36
38
40
42
-125 -123 -121 -119 -117 -115
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
Jurisdictions with 
population growth or 
building permit caps
+ spatial center
32
34
36
38
40
42
-125 -123 -121 -119 -117 -115
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
Jurisdictions with urban 
growth boundary
+ spatial center
32
34
36
38
40
42
-125 -123 -121 -119 -117 -115
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
Jurisdictions with 
adequate public facility 
ordinances
+ spatial center
32
34
36
38
40
42
-125 -123 -121 -119 -117 -115
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
Jurisdictions with 
restrictive zoning
+ spatial center
32
34
36
38
40
42
-125 -123 -121 -119 -117 -115
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
Jurisdictions with 
restrictive rezoning 
approvals
+ spatial centerStrategic Interaction and Spatial Multiplier Effects in Local Growth Control Policies 
 
 
 
 
  34
Figure 3. Spatial Distribution of Housing Market Outcomes 
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